Sharing the spoils

‘Friends’ of a coalition’s big party jostle to get ministries with high RoI. That’s how politics works

What’s the big difference this election has produced? Media speculation is not so much about which BJP heavyweight will land what plum ministry. Most interest is around big ministries BJP may have to let go of. Welcome back to coalition govts and frenetic bargaining about how to share the spoils.

Just being practical |  Jockeying for ministries is not bad. If voters haven’t opted for a single party majority, it’s legitimate for members of a coalition to want ministries they prefer. They owe their voters that. Also, politicians are nothing if not practical. They are unlikely to push matters to a breaking point. Who wants to contest elections prematurely? Running a political party is expensive. 

Variety of needs| Ministry preferences are best understood in terms of meeting basic political needs. There are ministries like home that allow exercise of huge executive power. Finance, another biggie, has the power over allocating govt’s funds to other ministries. And big stock market players are obsessed with what FinMin is doing. Railways employ lakhs of people. These are ministries with real influence. There are also ministries that potentially provide political parties with a high return on political investment. Think defence – all those arms contracts. Think roads and highways. Politicians love these ministries, and not just because they are important for the country. 

Art of possible| Bismarck, the 19th century German politician, described politics as the art of the possible, the attainable and the next best. Coalitions are just that. No majority, no problem. It’s possible to form a govt. But politics is also at heart a transaction. For junior partners, joining a govt must be worth the effort. They need bragging rights and, shall we say, bagging rights – the right to bag goodies. Back in 1990s and early 2000s, some ministries used to be called ATMs. That moniker is still valid.

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